I. INTRODUCTION TO AFGHAN INFORMAL DISPUTE RESOLUTION
Afghan informal dispute resolution is a procedure in which parties bring their cases to community leaders or a third party who assists discussions and negotiations to reach a solution and to avoid legal proceedings.
1 Informal dispute resolution is common in rural areas of Afghanistan because of a general lack of access or inefficiency of the formal mechanism in those areas. 2 The Afghanistan Independence Human Right Commission illustrates in their report that there are no trial courts in 86 districts, "176 districts have no detention center and 92 districts have no active attorney." 3 Hence, a large number of criminal and civil disputes in Afghanistan are decided outside of the formal legal system through shuras and jirgas-informal systems that apply customary law. 4 The Afghan informal dispute resolution system has been praised for its advantages such as promptness, clarity, cultural familiarity, reliable and prompt resolutions, low cost, and accessibility. 5 It also has a reputation for unanimous enforceable decisions, trustworthiness and fairness, restorative justice, and preservation of harmony within the community. 6 Accordingly, a wide variety of civil and criminal disputes are resolved at the community level-most of which are land, water, and fuel disputes in civil cases, and deliberate and accidental killings, theft, runaways, and rape in criminal cases. While informal dispute resolution serves a respected and important role in Afghanistan, some of the common practices have been criticized for violating human rights and sharply deviating from Afghan formal laws. 8 For example, women are completely excluded in the judgment processes-men represent women and women are not allowed to defend themselves or to be present during any hearings or proceedings. 9 Another criticism of the Afghan informal dispute resolution system is that community-based mechanisms can be very susceptible to influence by warlords. 10 These local power-holders, who are sometimes elected as members of informal dispute resolution councils, are more likely to misuse the informal system. 11 Finally, other important concerns include customary practices like honor-killings, forced and underage marriage, badal (or direct vengeance), and payment of blood money in lieu of punishment. 12 One of the most controversial practices in the informal system is the practice of "baad"-the forced marriage of a woman from an offender's family to the victim's close relative to settle a dispute. 13 This aspect of informal dispute resolution has caught serious attention of the international community and human rights activists.
14 In fact, the Afghan government has been under extreme pressure to resolve this issue by trying to establish a relationship with informal justice mechanisms. 15 This paper attempts to show how those government efforts could be improved for more effective use of resources and increased justice for the Afghan people through learning from the example of Native American tribes. Native American Tribal justice systems could serve as ' helpful models for the Afghan approach to informal justice because they offer effective informal dispute resolution and "Peacemaking" systems that follow rules and regulations set by the formal tribal justice system. For instance, some Native American tribes use Peacemaking Programs for family disputes, alcohol related behavior, domestic violence, and even sex offenses. 16 Through the Peacemaking system, Peacemakers do not make decisions or impose punishments; however, they facilitate and guide parties to talk and to discuss the causes of conflict so that they can reach a decision amongst themselves. 17 Peacemakers encourage parties to eliminate conflicts by opening communication with respect and responsibility, helping parties assist themselves through healing their spirits, minds, and bodies. 18 Peacemakers work in cooperation and harmony with the formal justice system. 19 Learning from this cooperative approach in which traditional ways of dispute resolution are respected, this paper argues that, similar to the Native American informal justice system, the formal justice system in Afghanistan should form a relationship of communication and respect with the informal systems. This relationship could enable a process of monitoring by the formal system and an acceptable procedure by which formal courts could take jurisdiction over serious crimes such as honor killings, murder, rape, and sex offenses. This paper begins with an introduction to informal dispute resolution mechanisms in both Afghanistan and selected Native American Tribal systems, elaborating on the interaction between the informal and official state law in these various systems. Next, it describes the failed attempts of the Afghan central authority to rule in the informal justice systems and integrate them into the formal legal structure. Then the paper will provide possible cooperative solutions which would include coordination and respect between the formal and informal justice systems, monitoring of cases by members of the formal system including provincial governor, district governor, and other law enforcement institutions, and implementing procedures for removing important criminal cases such as 16 II. An Introduction to the Afghan Legal System
The complexities of Afghanistan's geography and religious, cultural, and political history have led to an equally complex legal landscape that incorporates various cultural traditions and religious perspectives. 20 As a landlocked country located in central Asia, its culture, traditions, and customs reflect those of its neighbors such as Pakistan, Iran, Turkmenistan, Tajikistan, Uzbekistan, and China. 21 Afghanistan has been an essential strategic and geopolitics location throughout its history. Islam was brought to Afghanistan during the eighth century by the followers of Prophet Muhammad (PBUH). 22 Prior to the introduction of Islam, Afghanistan was ruled by various Persian, Greek, Sassasian, and Central Asian empires. 23 In 1747, Ahmad Shah was elected by an Afghan Jirga as king of Afghanistan. 24 He unified different Afghan tribes and extended its emperor. 25 His clan was able to rule Afghanistan for the next 200 years.
26
Contemporary Afghanistan has a population of approximately 30,000,000 and its legal system is composed of three competing parts: Islamic law, customary law, and civil law. 27 Throughout its history, Afghanistan's legal system was based on Islamic law and customary law. 29 Islamic law was implemented by proficient religious judges following the Hanafi jurisprudence. 30 Unlike common law, there was no system of judicial precedent (stare decisis) in the country. 31 Islamic scholars (Ulama) were supposed to use their broad knowledge of Islamic law and its authoritative sources, Quran, hadith, and Hanafi jurisprudence to create legal norms. 32 Until the formation of the modern Afghan state, Islamic scholars were independent in leading the legal system and providing both laws and legal interpretations. 33 In other words, the Afghan legal system fell under religious law. Customary law was implemented in the most rural areas; at the same time, however, there were no statutory provisions.
34
There are variations from province to province with respect to the relationships between formal and informal justice systems-meaning that in some provinces, people refer to informal justice systems more than they do to formal justice systems. 35 In some provinces such as Nangarhar, there is collaboration between the formal and informal justice systems. 36 However, in some other provinces, the courts are averse to the informal dispute resolution system. 37 Legal pluralism in Afghanistan is composed of the interaction and cooperation between Sharia law, custom, and state law including international human right principles within the state law's framework. 38 In the late 20 th century, the codification process began and state legal codes became the exclusive source of legal authority-these laws were firmly based on Islamic Law. 40 King Abdur Rahman began to codify statues and codes in 1880. 41 He created a state-run court system and elevated the status of Islamic law to the status of official state law.
42
Through legal reforms, he distinguished sources of law in Afghanistan. 43 He divided them into three categories: Islamic law, customary law, and statutory law. 44 He also established three types of courts: Islamic law courts, criminal courts, and commercial law courts. 45 Thus, the legal system of Afghanistan became mixed. In 1923, during King Amanullah's reign, the first modern constitution of Afghanistan was passed and major social and legal reforms were carried out through a series of codes and decrees. 46 Turkish and French advisers assisted with these legal reforms. 47 Although some customs are essential to dispute resolution, some of them are harmful to society and conflict with state laws. For instance, jailing the women who run away from forced marriages without family permission; the practice of badal (the exchange of girls between two families); the marriage promise of an unborn girl to an unborn boy; engagement during childhood; and badd (where girls are given for marriage as compensation for a crime-the girls get married to a member of the family of the victim to end and prevent future enmity between the families).
59
These traditional approaches to conflict resolution, restoration, and punishment are problematic, but widely practiced. However, there are also many important, just, and effective ways that the informal justice system helps people resolve conflict, addressing a wide range of issues including civil disputes such as land, family disputes, and criminal disputes such as, murder, theft, and assault, rape, and adultery. Throughout history, the Afghan formal legal system has tried to play a central role in governing of the lives of the majority of Afghan citizensespecially in rural areas. A split in the legal system between formal and informal has existed ever since an endeavor was made to create statutory laws. 61 However, after the Taliban government fell, informal dispute resolution increasingly gained authority because the new government failed to control rural areas and to provide security to the public. Afghanistan has fourteen different ethnic groups who share a common religion: Islam. 63 Their combination of cultures and strong religious beliefs create the regional informal justice system that is practiced in Afghanistan today. 64 Some of the informal dispute mechanisms may violate human rights, 65 while others are beneficial to the Afghan community. This paper will address both harmful and peaceful aspects of dispute resolution.
a. Peaceful Informal Dispute Resolution
Despite the serious problems discussed above, a majority of Afghans continue to turn to traditional or informal justice mechanisms to address both civil and criminal disputes. These mechanisms include tribal councils, consultation, and mediation with village and religious leaders.
66
In rural areas of Afghanistan, including areas recently cleared of insurgents, the best mechanism to make essential, visible, short-term gains in peacefully resolving disputes is to refer cases to the local traditional mechanisms, "including tribal and community councils that have operated in local communities for centuries."
67 "These councils . . . 68 In addition, informal dispute resolution has the advantage of familiarity with the people of communities in rural areas and is less costly, more accessible, and more effective than formal courts. 69 The local shuras and jirgas focus on the consent of parties -not on a winner and loser -so a decision is reached faster than in formal courts. For instance, in the Bamiyan province of Afghanistan, a girl whose name was Aqela loved a boy whose name was Nasir. 72 They wanted marry each other and Nasir asked the girl's father to accept their engagement. 73 Aqela's father did not reject the request, but he demanded a high bride-price from Nasir.
74 Nasir could not afford this price so the couple ran away together. 75 When elders of the village caught them, they investigated whether the girl ran away freely or by force. 76 When they found that the girl had gone with Nasir freely, they advised the girl's family to agree on an affordable bride-price. 77 Aqela's father finally accepted and the couple was able to marry each other. 78 This case illustrates how elders can help communities solve their disputes in a peaceful ways, in less time, and with desirable results.
In another case, Jalasa (an elders' panel) endeavored to solve a family dispute between two brothers peacefully. 79 The victim, Fauzia, was beaten by her brother-in-law's family which resulted in a miscarriage. 80 After referring the case to Jalasa, the panel found Fauzia's brother-inlaw guilty and decided that he should compensate all of Fauzia's medical expenses. 81 The parties agreed, and the dispute was resolved peacefully.
82
In addition to solving these smaller disputes between individuals, sometimes jirga and shura can solve much larger disputes too and in much less time than a formal Afghan court. 83 An example of such a dispute concerned possession of and the right to live in a village as a member of a particular clan or tribe. 84 Two qawms (clans), "(one of settled villagers and one of Kuchi, who had migrated to the area for generations, and who during the Soviet-mujahideen war had settled in the village more permanently)," in Nangarhar province had a land dispute that led a villager to burn Kuchis' houses. 85 This large dispute was brought to various formal courts and government bodies since the collapse of the Soviet Union; however, the courts were unable to solve the dispute. 86 However, recently, a jirga, presided over by the governor of the Nangarhar province, was capable of solving this dispute. 87 Even though the government officials were involved, such as the governor and police, none of the violators who burned the houses were ever prosecuted. 88 Instead of prosecuting them, the jirga used customary practices to maintain peace in the village. 89 According to the decision of the jirga, those who burned the houses had to apologize and walk toward the Kuchis' village without showing pride. 90 In addition, the Kuchi had to commit themselves to the village and to protect the security of the village and its people from outside threats.
91
The above decisions show not only fairness but also prevention of enmity between families and communities. For this reason, this paper asserts that the Afghan government, and also the people of the various Afghan communities, should support the continuation and preservation of this kind of informal dispute resolution.
b. Informal Dispute Resolution and Violations of Individual Rights
Although informal dispute resolution is more accessible, less costly, more legitimate, and less corrupt than government courts, it frequently fails to protect many basic individual rights, particularly women's rights. The practice of baad (giving away of girls to resolve a dispute) is common in some rural areas of Afghanistan. 94 According to a report of United Nations Assistance Mission in Afghanistan, in the central region of Afghanistan, where the government has less authority and weak institutions, baad is widely-practiced. 95 As an informal dispute resolution, baad is used for resolution of criminal cases involving adultery, rape, and murder. 96 The practice of baad contradicts state law, Islamic principles, and violates human rights. As an example, in one murder case in the Wazir tribe of Afghanistan, a jirga decided that the defendant family should give the murder victim's family 300,000 Pakistani Rupees as compensation; further, a girl was arranged to be married to a member of the victim's family. 97 The reason for these practices of giving girls for marriage is to tie two families together through marriage and to change the "severe enmity into friendship;" 98 however, the consent of the girl is not considered nor the future the girl will face. In addition, unlike formal courts, the jirga "seek compensation for the wrong done and social reconciliation, not the punishment of the [ In another case from 2010, a 19 year-old girl was married to a 13-year old boy when her brother ran away with the boy's sister. 100 In this case, the runaway girl was fleeing her forced engagement with another boy.
101
A local shura from the Paryan district of Panjsher province mediated the case and decided that the father of the boy with whom the girl had eloped should pay $11,600 and give one of his daughters as compensation to the family of the girl's previous fiancée. 102 The father of the boy who eloped had to sell his livestock and land to pay for this compensation. 103 Another example of harmful informal dispute resolution outcomes is the forced marriage of adulterers and victims of kidnaping. "In cases involving the kidnapping of women or adultery, some tribes force the parties to marry, even against the wishes of the female involved." 104 "Marriage is often ordered in these cases on the basis of a belief that the female's chastity may have been taken, thereby compromising the honour and dignity of the woman and her family."
105 "For example, in Nuristan [province of Afghanistan], if a married women [sic] is 'consensually kidnapped,' the Jirga compels the current husband to divorce the woman so she can be married to the kidnapper."
106 "The former husband would be further compensated with the return of the dowry he previously paid and receiving animals from the offender." 107 Similarly, in some parts of the Kunduz Province, "if an unmarried couple commits adultery, the couple is ordered to be married and the family of the woman is compensated."
108
Another dispute that is decided by the elders of a tribe or community is rape.
109 "Investigation and penalty in rape cases is largely unaddressed within Afghan systems of customary law."
110 "Loss of virginity is perceived as ruinous to the prospects of women and girls and, as such, is
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[Vol. 25.1 hidden by the community whenever possible." 111 In the case of rape or sexual harassment, when a woman reports that she has been raped or sexually harassed, the responsible male may be killed. 112 When people discover a case of rape, the sentence imposed is harsh. "In one example, in a case of rape amongst Hazaras, the Jirga ordered the woman to receive 60 lashes and the male perpetrator be stoned to death." 113 Thereafter, her husband divorced her; she became depressed and finally died. 114 These decisions conflict with Islamic principles which mandate that marriage is based on the complete consent of a boy and a girl -whether she is a virgin, divorced or widowed. 115 change. 120 Instead, the majority of success has been with legal and justice reforms -primarily in the form of legislative reforms. 121 With corruption and deteriorated security as the biggest challenges, rural areas almost inevitably refer to traditional institutions to resolve their disputes; nonetheless, the above example of dispute resolution in the Nangarhar province highlight the role and monitoring of the informal justice system by Afghan state actors.
122 Arsala Jamal, the governor of the Khost province requested The Liaison Office to create the Commission on Conflict Mediation (CCM or "the Commission"). 123 The Commission was created in 2006, consisting of six respected tribal elders; it provides an informal dispute resolution to local people out-of-court. 124 In the first eighteen months, the Commission received thirty-one cases of which eighteen were solved, ten were in process, and three were submitted to formal courts. 125 The main reasons for the Commission's success are its ability to offer arbitration services free of charge and its ability to solve disputes impartially.
126
Afghanistan has progressed in moving towards the effective rule of law both in formal and informal legal systems, including the construction and rebuilding of justice infrastructures, capacity building trainings, drafting and passing of new laws, improving traditional justice mechanisms, and working closely with Community Based Dispute Resolution Mechanisms, which are at the center of these successes. 127 However, the predominance of warlords in some rural areas, wide-spread corruption in official offices, and lack of security in most areas of Afghanistan have slowed reforms. 
a. Afghan Criminal Courts
According to the Constitution of Afghanistan, the judiciary is an independent entity of the Islamic Republic of Afghanistan. 139 It consists of the Supreme Court, appeal courts, and preliminary or trial courts that all consist of criminal courts. 140 The Supreme Court manages its activities through its various departments or dewans. 141 In addition, the Supreme Court is responsible for the administration of a court system consisting of 34 provincial courts and 384 primary courts throughout Afghanistan. 142 The Supreme Court of Afghanistan has five divans-one of which is a criminal diwan. 143 The second court with the highest authority is the Appellate court. 144 All provinces have the Court of Appeals for various departments or diwans-one of which is a criminal diwan that settles criminal cases at the provincial level. 145 The lowest court in the hierarchical structure of the Afghan court system is comprised of the primary courts. 146 The primary courts are located within districts and cities. 147 The numbers of departments vary from district and city.
148 Generally, each district has a primary court that settles civil and criminal cases at the district level. The judiciary branch has exclusive authority to resolve disputes between individuals or institutions and individuals. 150 153 In other words, in some areas, especially rural areas, the courts do not have jurisdiction and that is because of a lack of efficiency of formal courts in these areas.
V. INFORMAL CRIMINAL JUSTICE SYSTEM
Because state justice organizations do not have much presence in many parts of the country, especially in rural areas, and are incapable of solving many disputes in justifiable ways that meet the needs of Afghanis, in many parts of the country, people prefer to bring their cases to informal dispute resolution mechanisms, or community-based dispute resolution, which they find to be more transparent, clear, and predictable. 155 As explained in previous sections, these practices can involve such harsh remedies as forcing marriage between a girl from a murderer's family with a member of the murder-victim's family. 156 Despite these deeply rooted traditions, Afghanistan's informal legal system is in flux 157 because some educated people in rural areas do not want to follow informal dispute resolution that has negative effects on societies such as giving girls as compensation (Badal), child marriage, and so on. 
a. Traditional Mechanisms of Dispute Resolution
Afghans have used traditional mechanisms of dispute resolution for centuries. 159 Informal mechanisms are known as jirgas, shuras, community development councils, and other Afghan customary justice mechanisms. 160 The traditional mechanisms of dispute resolution pre-date the formal justice mechanisms and they have been used as a means of dispute resolution and communal reconciliation for issues of both a civil and criminal nature. 161 The purpose of shura and jirga, or any other traditional mechanism of dispute resolution is to restore harmony in a community. 162 Unlike formal courts, traditional dispute resolution bodies have a different objective. 163 The formal courts focus on establishing guilt and punishing the guilty, while the traditional courts focus on the needs of the victim and society's harmony. 164 To achieve this, Coburn Noah, a researcher and writer at the Unites States Institutes of peace points out that "[i]nformal dispute resolution often relies on bodies of elders whose collective reputations give the resolution legitimacy and create collective social pressure on the community to respect the decision." 165 The community elders and other respected individuals sit together in the shuras, jirgas, or other Community Development Councils to reach equitable resolutions and to reconcile the "disputants, their families and the community as a whole." 166 Traditional justice mechanisms are perceived by the local population to be less costly and more accessible than the state courts. Traditional mechanisms of dispute resolution have been praised for promptness, clarity, effectiveness, and being familiar to the population; they are also less costly and more accessible than formal courts. 170 In addition, the decisions of shuras and jirgas tend to be acceptable for both sides of a conflict, reaching final resolutions in much less time than formal courts 171 Unlike in court proceedings, the main purpose of informal resolution is to eliminate a dispute in a peaceful manner rather than focus on a winner and loser or on penalizing wrongdoers.
172
Almost all of the literature on post-war justice systems in Afghanistan focus on the benefits of traditional mechanisms of dispute resolution, pointing to the effectiveness, cultural familiarity, lack of corruption, prompt resolutions, cheaper costs, accessibility, unanimity, enforceable decisions, trust and fairness, and focus on restorative justice and preserving harmony within the community. 173 At the same time, traditional mechanisms of dispute resolutions are associated with sharp violations of state law and sometimes even Islamic principles, which reduces the appeal of traditional dispute resolution in the eyes of some people in Afghanistan and the international community. Chief among these failings concerns the subjugation of women in the process itself. Traditional dispute mechanisms put men in a position of power and exclude women from the judgment processes; regardless of the nature of the dispute, whether it concerns rape, domestic violence, marriage, children, or property, men represent women and women are not allowed to participate in the proceedings or voice their own concerns. 175 Second, the most criticized aspect of using traditional mechanisms of dispute resolution is baad-the marriage of a woman from the offender's family to the victim's close relative to settle a dispute. 176 This aspect of the traditional dispute resolution has caught a lot of attention by the international community and human rights activists. 177 Notably, the Afghan government has been under extreme pressure to resolve this issue by trying to establish a relationship with informal justice mechanisms in rural areas, but these efforts have mostly failed because law enforcement institutions are weak or do not exist at all in those areas. 178 Third, community-based mechanisms can be very susceptible to dominance by warlords. 179 Local power-holders, who are mostly elected as members of informal justice mechanisms through their influence and force, are more likely to misuse the informal system because they are driven to protect their own illegal activities and benefits-warlords use their gunmen and political influence to impose their decisions on both formal institutions and local people. 180 In some instances, informal dispute resolution has become a shopping arena for rich people; in fact, they pay the warlords to judge in their favor when they have a dispute. 181 Importantly, the poor have to accept any verdict either in their favor or not. 182 Finally, as few incidents have been illustrated in previous sections, other drawbacks include honor-killings, forced and underage marriage, and payment of blood money in lieu of punishment.
185
In conclusion, with the majority of the Afghan population living in rural areas, the traditional mechanisms of dispute resolution will always be the first choice to resolve disputes, and with insufficient or no control by the government to monitor their process of judgment, the human rights violations threatens to remain a strong drawback and challenge to the justice system in Afghanistan.
186 Therefore, the focus of next chapter will be on how to establish a relationship between the formal and informal justice systems to fight and eliminate these challenges.
VI. AN INTRODUCTION TO THE NATIVE AMERICAN LEGAL SYSTEM
Similar to Afghanistan, U.S. Native American tribes have grappled with balancing their formal justice systems with a long history of informal, traditional ways of resolving conflict. 187 Traditionally, Native American tribes had various expressive and creative ways of conducting dispute resolution. 188 These dispute resolution methods were not familiar to the European settlers. 189 Thus, settlers discounted and even discouraged Native American methods of dispute resolution. 190 In 1883, the Department of Interior established "Courts of Indian Offenses" or "Courts of Federal Regulations" ("CFR Courts") to settle less serious criminal cases among the tribal members. 191 Many judges of these courts were non-Native American. 192 In 1934, the Indian Reorganization Act (25 U.S.C.A. § 461, et. seq.) was adopted not only to allow Native American tribes to exercise their inherent sovereignty, but to establish their own justice codes, run their own court systems applying those laws, and create and adopt their own constitutions. 193 Furthermore, the Act provided a framework for the tribes to gradually build and expand their tribal governments. 194 Some tribes have been successful in developing judicial systems while others are trying to construct and develop their government within the U.S. adversarial system framework. 195 Some tribes use and prefer the U.S. adversarial system, while others still apply traditional dispute resolution.
196 Native American governments adopting new laws and their courts apply these laws along with custom and tradition to settle disputes. 197 Thus, some Native American tribes use positive law, regulations, and traditions to settle civil and criminal disputes of their members.
VII. FORMAL NATIVE AMERICAN JUSTICE SYSTEM
The Native American criminal justice systems are composed of both formal and informal methods of dispute resolution. 199 In the Navajo reservation; there is a significant integration between formal courts and informal peacemaking courts through active monitoring and partnership. 200 In addition, the Native American criminal justice system 
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[Vol. 25.1 has a complex relationship with the U.S. state and federal systems that can result in conflicts and misinterpretation. 201 The study of criminal justice systems in Native American reservations is complex and overloaded with "cultural, economic, emotional, political, and social undertones." 202 a. Native American Courts
The Native American formal tribal courts primarily rely on an adversarial system of dispute resolution similar to the U.S. state and federal courts. 203 However, many contemporary tribal communities have adopted a dual justice system incorporating both the American model of justice and indigenous models of justice. 204 The U.S. adversarial system includes pleadings, counterclaims, cross examination, discovery, and a final judgement; 205 in contrast, under indigenous models of justice, community members and traditional methods of justice apply a more holistic philosophy guided by customary law, traditions, and practices that are learned primarily by example and through the oral teachings of tribal elders. 206 Thus, the informal or traditional dispute mechanism in Native American tribes is based on a non-adversarial system. The jurisdiction of Native American courts over criminal offenses is restricted to the classification of the offense and the place of the incident. 208 Offenders of serious crimes are tried in federal courts whereas crimes committed outside the reservation are within the state court's jurisdiction. 209 Subject matter jurisdiction in criminal cases is related to the three following issues: 1) whether the victim and defendant are Indian, 2) whether the criminal act is committed in Indian country or on a reservation, 3) the nature of the crime or offense (whether it is felony or misdemeanor). 210 According to the Major Crimes Act (18 U.S.C. § 1153 (1988)), the federal government exercises its jurisdiction over Native American members if they commit one or more of the thirteen violent felonies that are listed as follows:
211 "Murder, manslaughter, kidnapping, maiming, a felony under chapter 109 A, incest, assault with intent to commit murder, assault with a dangerous weapon, assault resulting in serious bodily injury, arson, burglary, robbery and felony under section 661 of this title within Indian Country." 212 The Assimilative Crimes Act (18 U.S.C. § 1162) and the Organized Crime Control Act are also applicable to members of Indian Country. 213 Thus, tribal law enforcement institutions cannot settle the aforementioned criminal cases and the involvement of federal law enforcement agencies is necessary. 214 However, approximately 170 reservations have their own law enforcement department, but they do not have exclusive jurisdiction on all criminal matters. 215 First, they should distinguish the type of offense (felony or misdemeanor), offender (enroll member or state citizen), and place of crime (Indian country, state, or federal territory). 216 Many Native American tribes tend to have alternative dispute resolution mechanisms rooted in custom and traditional practices. 218 One of the most effective and developed of these practices is "peacemaking" and "traditional dispute resolution."
219 Traditional dispute resolution is an ancient form of dispute resolution in which people bring their cases to the elders who use custom and tradition to solve cases, while peacemaking is a mechanism that was created just a few decades ago through the help of formal courts and institutions in which a peacemaker brings parties together to discuss the conflict or dispute to reach a consensual agreement. 220 Nowadays, both peacemaking and traditional dispute resolution are used to solve civil and criminal cases through informal mechanisms in Native American reservations. Another type of dispute resolution is traditional dispute resolution in which tribal members use customary and traditional procedural norms that call for non-adversarial forms of conflict management. 222 Although Indian tribes were given the authority to run their own court systems a century ago, some of them preferred to maintain traditional values of dispute resolution to a greater extent over formal courts. 223 Thus, tribal courts have been using traditional law in different areas of law. 224 The method of using traditional law varies from tribe to tribe; however, they all share a similar purpose reflective of native customs and traditions.
225
The Navajo Nation has a "horizontal" traditional model of justice that is to show equality among people and, according to which, no person is above another. 226 In this system, victims, defendants, and others who are effected by the committed crime, get together to discuss the situation, find the causes of crime, express their emotions, and agree on compensation that would restore the lost harmony to all concerned. 227 In addition, the horizontal model of dispute resolution shares the same principles related to the healing of parties. 228 The traditional indigenous and restorative justice movement trends deal with very concrete processes to settle disputes, especially adult criminal and juvenile wrongdoing cases.
229
Some tribes use traditional dispute resolution in both civil and criminal cases, while others prefer to apply traditional mechanisms of dispute resolution only in civil cases. 230 For example, the Hopi, a Native American tribe located in Arizona, have traditional dispute resolution justice in civil cases; however, unlike some other tribes, the Hopi court also has jurisdiction on some more serious crimes.
231
The Hopi tribe has about 15,000 enrolled members, most of whom live in villages. 232 Each village elects its governor, who has exclusive authority to decide civil cases such as land disputes, divorces, child custody issues, and so on. 233 Parties can elect to handle their cases in formal Hopi courts; however, the governor must waive his right to hear the case. 234 In most cases, the governor agrees to refer the case to the These examples of harmony and balance between formal and informal justice practices in Native American tribes could be instructive to countries like Afghanistan in which tribal groups have long traditions of informal dispute resolution. 236 Indeed, Afghanistan's tribal approaches to informal justice dispute resolution share many values and attributes with these native American systems, including cost-effectiveness, time efficiency, and reasonable resource allocation; however, unlike Native American peacemaking systems, the Afghan informal system has been known to violate state law and human rights.
237 Nevertheless, as this paper explores below, looking to the Native American examples may not only help Afghanistan find a better balance between the informal and formal systems, but it may also provide a way to eliminate these human rights abuses in the informal system.
b. Peacemaking & Peacemakers
Navajo Peacemaking is a form of restorative justice that handles disputes to recover relations between individuals in conflict. 238 It is one of the most contemporary restorative justice programs in the world. The peacemaking program is a "horizontal system of justice"; this means that parties are treated equally with the aim of preserving ongoing relationships and returning harmony to the parties to the conflict.
241
The system is considered to be a significant alternative to tribal courts on reservations.
242
Although the first Peacemaker Courts were established in 1982, they were quickly institutionalized into a Peacemaking Court system in 1991. 243 The Navajo Nation judges created some rules for Peacemaker Courts to resolve disputes through informal mechanisms without the formal adversarial procedures used by the Navajo Tribal Court. 244 In the 2000s, the Peacemaking Court's name was changed into "Peacemaking" and Chief Justice Claudeen Bates-Arthur substituted the peacemaking rules into guidelines. 245 Later the Council approved the Fundamental Law of Dine, and established a peacemaking division, later the "Peacemaking Program", to educate people and develop hozhoji naat aah (may I walk in peace) throughout the Navajo reservation. 246 Hence, the Navajo peacemaking program not only solves civil and criminal cases, but also educates members of tribes to solve the disputes themselves and to prevent possible future conflicts.
247
Similar to other restorative justice programs, the Navajo peacemaking courts are held outside of the formal justice halls. 248 The peacemaking process, rather than relying on the services of formal judges, lawyers, and legal supporters, rely on peacemakers who are known for their fairness, wisdom, respect, and planning ability by community people as decision-making authorities. 249 Like other Native Nation restorative programs, peacemaking is an accessible, affordable, and informal way of resolving conflict and achieving justice for Native American communities and families. 250 [Vol. 25.1 Navajo Peacemaking endeavors to repair the relationship of both sides of the dispute instead of focusing on retaliation.
251 Thus, it does not label the defendant as the "offender" and the other side as the "victim."
252
Each side of the dispute could possess qualities of victimization.
253
"Moreover, the actualization of violence perpetrated by one person on another will ultimately be understood as the absence of love and nurturance for that person." 254 Peacemaking sessions are held to repair damaged feelings of both sides of the dispute; therefore, the process continues until feelings of parties are satisfied. 255 Peacemaker, Elaine Henderson, says that Peacemakers solve conflicts between parties by giving them advice, healing their hearts, and making them aware of possible results of cases.
256 A Peacemaker concentrates on the relationships between people. 257 She believes "clanship" relates person to person and strengthens relationships. 258 According to clanship, someone is your brother, uncle, or father; so, a father and uncle have the responsibility to look after you and prohibit you from bad behavior.
259
Everyone has to respect others and take part in problem solving. 260 Ultimately, Ms. Henderson also explains that her role is to remove the misunderstanding and miscommunication among people in the community. 261 She teaches culture, tradition, clanship, and discipline to make parties aware of their culture, tradition, and past relation that make them aware of whatever they may have forgotten from their past.
262
Although cases between neighbors and relatives constitute a large number of peacemaking cases, quite a few cases are also criminal such as: burning down of people's homes, threats to murder, and occasional assault and battery cases. 
i. Peacemaking in Criminal Cases
With the evolution of tribal government, criminal law and procedure has changed. 264 Even though the U.S. federal government gave authority to the Navajo and other Indian tribes to run their own courts approximately a century ago, the Navajo Nation maintains traditional values of dispute resolution to a greater extent than other tribal courts in many other American Indian communities. 265 Many Native American courts have different programs in their prosecutor's office that include community justice and formal dispute resolution. 266 Peacemaking is one good way to recommend appropriate disciplinary actions to the criminal or defendant and to address victims' rights. 267 Parties to the conflict; victims and its relatives; and defendant and its relatives, settle and agree on the terms of sentence and ask a Peacemaker to deliver it for them.
268
In addition, Peacemakers can influence decisions not by imposing them or taking sides; instead they present ideas and suggestions on how parties can discuss and resolve their disputes. 269 Thus, Peacemaking is a pivotal settlement of dispute approach for Native American communities since it includes their involvement in the dispute resolution process and responds to their needs. 270 In addition, it is a good rehabilitative process for the offenders because in Navajo restorative justice the burden is on all components of the justice system to work for the offender's rehabilitation and bring him or her back to the community in a peaceful way. 271 In addition, this system does not label individuals as the offender, or wrongdoer, and the victim. 272 Instead, it encourage parties to "Hozhoogo naashaadoo (may I walk-in peace) and Hozhoojii saad bee atchI yadeilti doo (may we communicate in peace)." 273 The Peacemaking warlords exacerbate the problem in rural areas because they misuse their power and influence; 3) the presence of widespread corruption especially in the district courts. 283 Therefore, it is better to focus on strengthening and reforming existing traditional institutions and linking them to state institutions rather than trying to marginalize them.
In the short term, cooperation between the informal dispute settlement mechanisms and the formal legal institutions will produce a much better system that can resolve community disputes. For instance, the involvement of the formal system would reduce the freedom of jirgas and shuras in dispute settlement by subjecting them to a series of rules and regulations. Regardless, the informal system would still be accessible to tribal and community members possibly throughout the country.
While the absence of trust in the formal institution, due to widespread corruption, has created a sense of dissatisfaction and the feeling that the legal institutions are unfair, once the two systems are linked, the local peoples' trust will increase in the system because of the integration of their own leaders into the formal system, who they can trust. Accordingly, the creation of a mechanism that links the formal courts and institutions with the informal one is necessary and can function quite efficiently. This will function similar to the Peacemaking Program in the Navajo Nation, where the minor criminal disputes are settled by the informal entities and the outcome is registered and recorded in the formal courts records.
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In addition, the Afghan informal justice system is praised for its promptness, clarity, cultural familiarity, trustworthy outcomes, prompt resolutions, lower costs, accessibility, unanimous enforceable decisions, fairness, and focus on restorative justice and preserving harmony within the community; 285 however, it has been condemned for violation of human rights, especially women's rights, Islamic principles, and state law. 286 For example, as explained above, shuras and jirgas treat women quite discriminatorily and harsh in cases involving marriage and divorce issues. 287 They also do not pay due regard to Islamic and state law and [Vol. 25.1 principles because they mostly rely on traditional custom to resolve major criminal cases, including cases that involve murders, rapes, housefleeing, and theft. 288 Thus, in the long term, it is better to limit the authority of the informal justice system to less serious crimes and to restrict decisions for more serious criminal cases to the formal courts.
a. Barriers to Implementing this New Approach Both formal and informal justice systems in Afghanistan are confronted with some barriers; these barriers do not let the systems solve civil and criminal matters appropriately and effectively. 289 Some of these barriers are as follows.
i. Security
The justice system of Afghanistan, like elsewhere, is closely related to security. 290 Lack of security is one big barrier toward access to justice and stabilizing the rule of law. 291 Thus, it is difficult to implement state laws and regulations in some rural areas of Afghanistan.
292 It can also be a barrier to implementing some of the broad and unfocused traditional dispute resolutions such as jirgas and shuras because the insurgents only believe in their own justice system to ensure their own interests. 293 Unfortunately, that justice system is neither in accordance with the state law of Afghanistan nor Islamic Law and the cultural values of the people. 294 However, one possible solution could be to start the reform from the secure places and expand it to other areas gradually. That reform includes involving more local actors that deliver justice and maintain the rule of law through informal dispute resolution. That way, justice will be delivered and the rule of law will be maintained while also strengthening the security situations and bringing stability by promoting local actors and elders who are valued and are perceived to be deserved decision-makers in the area.
ii. Lack of Rule of Law
The contemporary formal justice system of Afghanistan, including formal courts, is often seen to be, corrupt, expensive, inaccessible, and not trustworthy to the rural people. 295 In addition, some judges, prosecutors, and police officers are not well trained and sometimes they themselves violate state laws. 296 Hence, the formal justice institutions are less capable to settle serious crimes and monitor the informal justice system when dealing with less serious crimes. However, strengthening the rule of law may be achieved through maintaining security by empowering the Afghan police and National Army.
It is unrealistic to believe that informal justice systems are immune from warlords, corruption, nepotism, and other factors influencing the procedural fairness. A big barrier is the interference of local commanders, warlords, and powerful government officials in the decision-making processes within the system of informal legal practices. 297 Another barrier is the lack of legal knowledge among community leaders or elders. 298 Most of the jirgas and shuras members are local elders who only have basic legal knowledge or none at all regarding the laws and regulations of Afghanistan. 299 Thus, while making decisions, they possibly violate state laws and human right principles. In order to improve the informal justice system in the rural areas of Afghanistan and avoid the corrosive aspects of informal dispute resolution, I propose the following recommendations: 
i. Collaboration of Formal Courts and Law Enforcement Institutions with the Informal Justice System
The Native American justice system, especially the Navajo Nation justice system, could be a good model for the Afghan government to follow, because in the Navajo Nation, there is not only collaboration of courts with the peacemaking program, but also with other government institutions in order to achieve its goals. 301 Similarly, the Afghan courts and law enforcement institutions could help community-based resolution bodies to solve most criminal and civil cases in peaceful ways that could fulfill the needs of both parties to the conflict.
ii. Appropriate Dispute Resolution
Like the Native American peacemaking program, the Afghan informal justice system should focus on healing hearts, finding appropriate alternatives, and peaceful resolution of disputes. As mentioned above, Native American tribal peacemaking programs solve criminal disputes in ways that satisfy the needs of the parties to the conflict and do not contradict reservation law or state law. 302 
iii. Who Should Decide What?
The Afghan informal justice system should settle only minor criminal cases. Cases involving murder, theft, rape, honor killing, and so on, should be handed by formal legal institutions. Like the Native American tribes, if these cases are brought to informal dispute bodies, they should be removed to the formal courts through a mutually respectful process fostered by a cooperative relationship and communication between the formal and informal systems. As a part of this cooperative relationship, province governors and district governors should be given authority to observe informal dispute resolution in less serious criminal cases, and the convention of jirga and shura should be called upon to settle large dispute between tribes.
iv. Educating Community Members
The Navajo peacemaking programs educate the community members on how they should settle their disputes and inform them of their social responsibilities. 303 This program has been very effective in the Navajo Nations, and the Afghan informal justice system could benefit from the same kind of programming. This programming could be led by local elders, law school students, and maybe even district governors who could educate the community members and inform them on the functions of the formal and informal justice systems and the ways in which they can resolve their disputes peacefully and effectively.
v. Communication, Monitoring, and Removal
The formal and informal justice systems can be integrated either through establishing formal institutions to take over and manage informal justice mechanisms. In this approach, informal justice mechanisms would refer cases to formally established institutions for settlement. The formal institutions would advise the informal institutions in settling that particular dispute. Then the informal institutions would issue the decision to the parties. This could be a mutual dispute settlement mechanism. However, this approach seems quite challenging to achieve, for two reasons. First, if formal institutions take over informal justice mechanisms, it is likely that formal institutions will face resistance from the local communities and tribes as they do not believe in the formal institutions' effectiveness. The second, and perhaps the more important, reason is that local communities and tribes are not willing to let the traditional way of settling disputes, which they have known since they first resolved a dispute, go easily.
A more realistic approach that can integrate the formal and informal justice systems in Afghanistan could be that both mechanisms should build a partnership in which informal institutions refers most serious criminal cases, such as murder, rape, and serious domestic violence to the formal institutions for settlement. Formal institutions in turn would refer less serious criminal cases, such as minor theft, less serious injuries, minor domestic violence, and obscenity to the informal system for
